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Young Children's Development of 
Understanding Self, Other, and Language 
MASUO KOYASU 
Graduate School of Education, Kyoto University 
It has been pointed out that there are at least three types of 
perspective-taking abilities: to infer what other people see (perceptual), 
to infer what other people feel (affective), and to infer what other people 
think (cognitive). These three types of perspective- taking abilities should 
be integrated into a unified theory of understanding another s mind. In 
this paper, I will first discuss a unified theory of understanding another s 
mind in young children including their perspective-taking abilities, theory 
of mind and display rules. These three topics relate to young children s 
concepts of self and other. Secondly, I will discuss the role of language 
or verbal communication to conceptualise self and other. Caregivers' 
participa- tion in conversations with children, and interactions between 
peers contribute significantly to the nature of the concepts of self and other. 
A clerk at the storefront asked a young boy, 'What can I do for you?' 
He replied, 'Give me what Mommy asked me to buy'. 
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This is an episode written by a Kyoto University student in his report as one of the 
recollections of his young childhood. To tell what I know from what you know is the 
key to understanding self and other. 
Every day we meet family, neighbours, friends, colleagues, and so on. We recognise 
other people. We live with them and we cannot live without them. In spite of this, it is 
not easy for us to understand other people. Those we believed akin to ourselves always 
reveal themselves to be different from what we first thought. This difference makes us 
aware of 'self and other' relationships. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PERSPECTIVE-TAKING ABILITIES 
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) claimed that young children are egocentric. This does not 
mean that they are selfish or greedy, but that they do not have the mental ability to 
understand that other people may have different beliefs or knowledge from themselves. 
Piaget and Inhelder (1948) carried out an experiment whereby children aged from 4 to 
12 viewed an arrangement of three model mountains (see Figure 1) along with a set of 
ten pictures from various positions around the display. They put a child in front of the 
display and then asked him or her to pick up from ten pictures the view that a wooden 
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doll at a different position would see. Younger 
children tended to select the picture of the view 
which they themselves saw. 
Young children are 'egocentric' in that they show 
only their 'own view', so Piaget claimed. A lot of 
studies have argued with this conclusion. Follow 
up studies have shown that Piaget overestimated 
the levels of egocentrism in children. The 
three-mountain task has been criticised for judging 
children's egocentrism or visual perspective-taking 0 
ability. For example, Borke (1975) found that 3-
and 4-year-olds can solve the three mountains 
task if the mountains are replaced with more 
familiar materials, such as dolls, toys and so on. 
Egocentricity can be manipulated by changing 
the complexity of cues, familiarity of materials, Figure 1 The three mountains task 
meaningfulness of the context and mode of 
responses. Therefore, the task is a rather 'noisy' insensitive measure (Flavell, 1977). 
However, the fact that young children fail in the original three mountain task and its 
similar tasks can never be denied. If it is true that young children are truly egocentric, 
why is it so? One reason might be that one cannot get feedback of other people's view. 
If this is the reason, then what would happen if they are given immediate feedback of 
other people's view? But how? 
A camera can be used to indicate the point of view of others (Kielgast, 1971; Ives, 
1980; Ives & Rakow, 1983). You can ask someone, 'What kind of scenes can you 
take by the camera there?' However, it does not give immediate feedback of view of 
others. I conducted two experiments on this topic using a camera and video camera. 
In the second experiment of Koyasu's (1997) study, a video camera on a tripod and a 
6-inch colour CRT monitor were introduced. Three toy animals from a TV program, 
a small album including fifteen photographs and a piece of yellow cardboard were 
used. Participants were fifty-six 5-year-olds (5;4) from a Japanese kindergarten. 
They were divided into the self-feedback group (16 boys and 12 girls, 5;4) and the 
experimenter-feedback group (17 boys and 11 girls, 5;4). They were given a cover 
story such as; 'The three animals are going to have their photographs taken. Today 
they would like to have the same pictures taken as these again (showing the album). 
But, they cannot stand or line up by themselves. So please line them up here (pointing 
to the yellow cardboard) to face this video camera'. There were three sessions in 
the experiment. In the pre-test session, fifteen photographs were used without any 
feedback. In the feedback training session, the experimenter turned on the switches 
of the video system. The self-feedback group was just allowed to watch the monitor, 
while the child in the experimenter- feedback group watched the monitor and every 
error made was pointed out by the experimenter. And in the post-test session, fifteen 
photographs were used without feedback again. 
The results of this experiment were as follows. In the pre-test session, six of the 
fifty-six children made front-back errors (89.3% correct). They put toy animals' face 
to themselves, not to the camera. Of these six children, only two continued to make 
these after the feedback session. It had been known from previous research that 
egocentrism for the right-left relationship is rarely de-centered even for 6-year-olds. 
As to the egocentrism for the right-left relationship, there was no difference 
between the mean scores of the pre-test and that of the post-test in the self-feedback 
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group, while the score was raised significantly (p<.001) between the two sessions 
in the experimenter-feedback group. Only a few showed egocentric responses 
for the front-back relationship, but there were many who were egocentric for the 
right-left relationship even after being given video feedback training. The effect of 
feedback-training was found only in the experimenter-feedback group. However, it 
is possible that they used an 'exchanging toy animals after the arrangement' strategy. 
Probably, they thought, 'This is a game to put toy animals as I think and then exchange 
them'. 
From this experiment, it was concluded that egocentrism is partly accounted for the 
scarcity of feedback received about other people's view. This accounts for egocentric 
responses for the front-back relationship, but not for egocentric responses for the 
right-left relationship. 
After these experiments, I have found an important fault in the three mountains task. 
It is that there are at least three ways for a child to answer it: 
1) To infer mental representations of others (perspective-taking); 
2) To infer mental representations of their own (mental simulation); and 
3) To infer by rotating the objects mentally (mental rotation). 
The perspective-taking paradigm cannot distinguish these. This is the reason why I 
moved to research on 'theory of mind'. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF 'THEORY OF MIND' 
The term 'theory of mind' was coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) and is often 
used to refer to the ability to impute or attribute mental states to self and others. The 
ability to attribute these mental states was called a 'theory' because mental states 
are not directly observable and hypothetical constructs of mental states can be used 
to predict other people's behaviours. The concept was first proposed in primate 
psychology, especially in studies of chimpanzees' social behaviours. It was claimed 
that chimpanzees might know what another chimpanzee was thinking, or was about 
to do. However, ten years after his first article on theory of mind, Premack (1988) 
concluded that much of the putative evidence of theory of mind in chimpanzees was 
only anecdotal and it seems to be difficult to say that chimpanzees have a theory of 
mind. 
The concept 'theory of mind' has fully evolved in developmental psychology. 
Wimmer and Perner's (1983) Maxi task was epoch- making in this respect. They 
told children a story about a child named 'Maxi', who places a piece of chocolate in 
a green cabinet and then goes out to play in the backyard of his house. While he is 
away, his mother moves the chocolate to a blue cabinet after having used it for making 
a cake. Later, Maxi comes in and he wants to have some chocolate. The test question 
is: 'Where will Maxi look for his chocolate?' Three-year-olds typically respond that 
Maxi will look for the chocolate in the blue cabinet, because they themselves know it 
is there and it is difficult for them to understand that their perspective is different from 
Maxi's. Alternatively, most six-year-olds take the perspective of Maxi and answer 
that he will look for the chocolate in the green cabinet where he left it. Thus, contrary 
to Piaget's suggestion, Maxi task has shown that young children as young as six can 
take the perspective of another person. Perner (1991) stressed that a strict definition of 
'theory of mind' is to pass a false belief task, a general appellation of the Maxi task, or 
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to understand misrepresent- ations other people have. 
I conducted a longitudinal research study on 'theory of mind' for three years in a 
kindergarten (Koyasu, Hattori, & Goushiki, 2003). Participants were a hundred and 
four kindergarteners (53 boys and 51 girls). Individual assessment of the children was 
undertaken once a year during the research period. Figure 2 shows the results of the 
false belief task. No children between the ages of three and four could pass this task 
while eighty-five percent of children between the ages of five and six could do so. 
Figure 3 shows the results of longitudinal changes in acquiring 'theory of mind'. This 
figure shows that there is no regression after having acquired 'theory of mind' but with 
one exceptional case. 
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF DISPLAY RULES 
Kurdek and Rodgon (1975) classified three types of perspective- taking tasks. They 
are: 
( a) To infer what other people see (perceptual); 
(b) To infer what other people think (cognitive); and 
(c) To infer what other people feel (affective). 
Visual perspective-taking tasks measure type (a) and the false belief task measures type 
(b). Applying display rules is a candidate for measuring type (c). 
Research into emotions and facial expression is a very important area in psychology; 
the role of emotional communication in human development and the emotional 
underpinnings of normal and pathological social behaviour are but a couple of 
examples of areas of investigation. According to Ekman's (1971) theory of facial 
expression, the individual comes to learn a set of display rules (personal, situational, 
and cultural norms) that govern the presence and form of facial expressions. Display 
rules involve knowledge about the 'do's and don'ts' of expressing particular feelings 
in particular social contexts as well as the ability to control one's own behaviour in 
accordance with that knowledge. You should show a sad face in funerals, even if you 
hate them. 
Saarni's (1979) 'disappointing gift' paradigm is one of the most important methods: 
What will you do when you are given a disappointing gift? 
Do you hide your disappointment? 
To regulate behaviour in accordance with the display rule increased between the ages 
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of six and ten, and girls were more likely than boys to display positive behaviours. 
Gross and Harris (1988) showed that six-year-olds can understand that one can 
simulate an emotion while feeling another, and that such a display can mislead others. 
Our recent study (Mizokawa & Koyasu, 2007) examined young children's 
understanding of apparent crying and its misleading consequences. We evaluated the 
relationship between children's performance of two false belief tasks and children's 
understanding of apparent crying, as well as its misleading consequences. There were 
three research questions: 
Q 1. Do young children understand apparent crying? 
Q2. Do young children understand that apparent crying would mis-lead others? and 
Q3. Does understanding of apparent crying and its misleading consequences correlate 
with the acquisition of 'theory of mind'? 
Participants were sixteen 4-year-olds, twenty 5-yead-olds, and twenty five 6-year-olds, 
who were all administered the tasks individually. Materials used were: 
• Three 'crying tasks' (two apparent crying tasks and one real crying task); 
• Standard false belief task (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983); and 
• Second-order false belief task (Pemer & Wimmer, 1985). 
Three crying tasks include a story such as (a boy's version): 
1. The protagonist and a naughty boy Gonta are playing in the room. 
2. Gonta hides the protagonist's toy, and then he goes away. 
3-A. The protagonist is rubbing his eyes because he feels itchy. He appears to be 
crying. 
3-B. The protagonist finds his toy. He wants the naughty boy to apologise him. So, he 
decides to pretend to cry. 
3-C. The protagonist finds that his toy is lost. He feels sad and starts to cry. 
4. Then, Gonta comes back. 
There were two questions for each story. 
The belief question is: 'Does Gonta think 
that he is crying or he is not crying?' The 
reality question is: 'The protagonist looks 
like crying, doesn't he? So, is he really 
crying or not really crying?' A notebook 
computer was used to show three kinds of 
tasks on screen. 
The second-order false belief task is to 
ask a child to think about an individual's 
thoughts about a second individual' 
s thoughts about an objective event. 
Typically developing children should be 
able to pass this task between the ages of 
six and seven. 
The answers to the three research 
questions are as follows: 
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Figure 4 Three crying tasks; 
Apparent crying without deception (A), 
apparent crying with deception (B), 
and real crying (C). 
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AI. The answer to the first question, 'Do young children understand apparent 
crying?' is that understanding of apparent crying develops between the ages of 
four and six (see Table I). 
A2. The answer to the second question, 'Do young children under- stand that 
apparent crying would mislead others?' is 'No'. Even for 6-year-old children, it 
is hard to understand misleading consequences of another's apparent crying (see 
Table 2). 
A3. The answer to the third question, 'Do understanding of apparent crying and its 
misleading consequences correlate with the acquisition of theory of mind?' is 
that understanding of apparent crying only relates to the child's performance 
in the standard and second-order false belief tasks. But, this is not the case in 
understanding of misleading concepts. 
Table 1 Number and percentage of correct answers in the reality 
questions in the crying task A, B, and C 
Task A TaskB TaskC Age group (apparent crying (apparent crying (real crying) 
without deception) with deception) 
4 years old (n=16) 1(6.25%) 1(6.25%) 15(93.75%) 
5 years old (n=20) 9(45.00%) 6(30.00%) 15(75.00%) 
6 years old (n=25) 21(84.00%) 22(88.00%) 23(92.00%) 
Table 2 Number and percentage of correct answers in the belief 
questions in the crying task A, B, and C 
Task A TaskB TaskC Age group (apparent crying (apparent crying (real crying) 
without deception) with deception) 
4 years old (n=16) 0(0.00%) 0(0.00%) 13(81.25%) 
5 years old (n=20) 0(0.00%) 2(10.00%) 14(70.00%) 
6 years old (n=25) 2(8.00%) 2(8.00%) 22(88.00%) 
IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING ANOTHER'S 
MIND 
Younger children do not have a 'theory of mind' yet. This means that they are unable 
to separate their own beliefs, thoughts, and ideas from others. As far as feelings are 
concerned, children would exhibit empathy early on and are able to cooperate with 
others and yet they cannot understand that apparent crying would mislead others. 
However, how these two findings relate to the facts about visual perspective-taking 
ability? To answer this question, we need to construct a unified theory of understanding 
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other people's mind using comparable methods. Research in 'theory of mind' uses a 
false cognition task and we can use a false affection task in the research on display 
rules. How about research in perspective-taking abilities? The answer is that we need 
to develop a false perception task. 
I am now planning to use reflective glasses as materials. A person who wears 
reflective glasses can see through the glasses, but other people cannot see eyes of the 
wearer because the lenses are so coated that they reflect images like a mirror. I got a 
hint from Liben's (1978) study in which she used rose-coloured glasses. In her study, 
the experimenter and children aged three to seven each wore different coloured glasses 
and the child was asked to describe how a white card appeared to each of them. If the 
experimenter asked the child to infer the third person's belief about whether the wearer 
of reflective glasses can see things, it will be a false perception task. Using three 
comparable false representation tasks, 
we can come near to the unified theory 
of understanding another's mind. 
Perception helps people to notice 
and recognise things and events. It 
is limited to the on-line information 
processing of things and events. 
Cognition is to know, to understand, 
and to decide things and events. 
Affection is a state of mind or body to 
approach or to avoid things and events. 
It is certain that we cannot do without 
these three functions of the mind. 
However, we have little knowledge 
about the roles these functions take 
in the development of understanding 
another's mind. 
Figure 5 
A schematic model of unified theory of 
understanding other people's mind 
v. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHER 
Recent research has increasingly implicated the role of language in the development of 
understanding self and other. Is language necessary for understanding self and other? 
The answer can be both yes and no. Almost all animals can perceive the body of their 
own and that of others. They feel their own pain but not another's pain. They express 
their own pain bodily but not another's pain. However, is the expression of their own 
pain addressed to others? It is not always so. Language is important both in expressing 
their own pain to others and understanding pain other people might have, as well as in 
detecting other people's disguised pain. 
Milligan, Astington, and Dack (2007), University of Toronto research group 
members, have done a meta-analysis on how children's language ability is related to 
false-belief understanding. Using data from 104 studies (N=8,891), the meta-analysis 
determined the strength of the relation in children under age seven and examined 
moderators that might account for the variability across studies and direction of effect. 
The results indicate a moderate to large effect size overall that remains significant when 
age is controlled. Receptive vocabulary measures had weaker relations than measures 
of general language. Stronger effects were found from earlier language to later false 
belief, but not the reverse. 
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Language is important for children to understand self and other relationship in many 
ways. Executive function and narrative comprehension play important roles in the 
development of this understanding, as I will explain. 
Executive function: A series of studies has suggested that Japanese children pass 
the false belief task over a year after their Western counterparts. Wellman, Cross, and 
Watson (2001) reported that the lag in Japanese children's understanding is about six 
months. Naito and Koyama (2006) reported recently that while British children pass the 
false belief task by four and a half years, the same tasks are not reliably passed until the 
Japanese children are at least one and a half years older. This topic has been discussed 
as the relationship between 'theory of mind' and executive junction, such as inhibitory 
function and working memory. Inhibitory function is essential to pass a false belief task 
because children should inhibit their knowledge that, in the Maxi task, chocolate is now 
in the blue cabinet. Working memory is needed because children need to remember the 
main parts of Maxi story before being able to answer the three questions. 
Our recent study (Lewis, Koyasu, Ogawa, Oh, & Short, in preparation) has also 
shown a similar trend. Eighty-seven Japanese children (age range: 41-76 months) 
performed poorer on a false belief task, even though they showed more advanced skills 
in some executive tests as compared to eighty-one British children (age range: 32-63 
months). Regression analyses showed that while in the British data conflict inhibition 
predicted false belief understanding, no such links were found in the Japanese data. 
Asian children perform rather poorly on the false belief tasks, even though they 
show some advanced skills in some executive tests. Oh and Lewis (2008) assessed 
executive function and 'theory of mind' in Korean preschoolers. One example of 
inhibition measures is the day/night task in which eight cards depicting a picture of 
the sun and eight cards depicting a picture of the moon with some stars around it were 
used. Children were asked to say 'night' in response to sun cards and to say 'day' in 
response to moon cards. Oh and Lewis (2008) showed that Korean children younger 
than three and a half years of age showed ceiling effects on inhibition measures and the 
link between executive function and 'theory of mind' was not as strong as in the British 
sample. 
There are a number of possible reasons for this. Asian mothers emphasise the 
importance of the roles of sharing and helping over controlling their children' 
s emotions. Asian children under the age of seven sleep with their parents, which 
emphasises the familial bonds and interpersonal relationships. Using child-directed 
speech even in later years may be another important factor that contributes to slower 
conceptualisations of self and other. 
Narrative comprehension: False belief tasks normally include a story in which 
at least two protagonists appear. This presupposes some abilities of narrative 
comprehension. In Slaughter, Peterson, and Mackintosh's (2007) study, Australian 
mothers read wordless storybooks to their preschool-aged children. Mothers' narratives 
were analysed for mental state language. Children's false belief understanding was also 
assessed. Children's (N=30; Mage 3 years 9 months) false belief understanding was 
significantly correlated with mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about 
cognition, but not with mothers' simple mentions of cognition. In the second study, the 
same pattern was found in an older sample of typically developing children (N=24; 
Mage 4 years 7 months), whereas for children on the autism spectrum (N=24; Mage 
6 years 7.5 months), 'theory of mind' task performance was uniquely correlated with 
mothers' explanatory, causal, and contrastive talk about emotions. 
Adrian, Clemente, and Villanueva (2007) explored the relation- ships between 
mothers' use of cognitive state verbs in picture-book reading and the later development 
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of children's understandings of mind. In their study, Spanish mothers read stories to 
their children (N=41: aged between 3;3 and 5;11), and two false-belief tasks were 
administered. One year later, mothers read a story to 37 of those children who were 
also given four tasks to assess their advanced understanding of mental states. Mothers' 
early use of cognitive verbs in picture-book reading correlated with their children's 
later understanding of mental states. 
These two recent studies in Australia and Spain indicate that mothers' activities in 
fostering children's narrative understanding are decisive in understanding another's 
mind. 
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